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A HISTORY OF AUDITORS' INDEPENDENCE
IN THE U.S.
by
Edward W. Younkins
Wheeling College
Wheeling, West Virginia
Independence has long been a fundamental
concept to the attest function of the accounting
profession. Independence provides the profession
with a philosophical and historical foundation. At
one time independence was assumed to mean
integrity, honesty, and objectivity. Another
interpretation has referred to freedom from the
control of those whose records are being reviewed.
Independence has also been characterized as a state
of mind and a matter of character.
Thus, independence is considered to be the
cornerstone of the profession. The CPA must not
subordinate his or her judgment to clients,
bankers, governmental agencies, etc. In addition,
the CPA must avoid relationships which would be
likely to impair objectivity, permit personal bias, or
affect professional judgment.
The ongoing debate over the independence
concept with respect to certain service provided by
CPAs, the strong prohibitions with respect to an
auditor's relationship with clients, and the
increased pressure for fuller disclosures in financial
statements provide interest regarding the historical
and philosophical evolution of the concept. Thus,
the purpose of this article is to provide a summary
of the historical development of independence in
the United States as interpreted by various groups
and individuals. This will be done through the
discussion of the development of the independence
concept throughout four separate time periods or
eras.

Early Recognition of the Concept: 1900-1925
Concern in the United States regarding auditor
independence grew more slowly than it did in
England. The American Association of Public
Accountants (AAPA) was established in 1887 and
did not initially incorporate independence in its
constitution or bylaws.
By 1900, evidence of the development of the
concept was beginning to appear in literature as
seen in the following statement:
A public accountant acknowledges no
master but the public, and thus differs
from the bookkeeper, whose acts and
statements are dictated by his
employers. A public accountant's
certificate, though addressed to
president or directors, is virtually made
to the public, who are actually or
prospectively stockholders. He should
have ability, varied experience and
undoubted integrity.1
In 1907 the bylaws of the AAPA were amended
to recognize the importance of avoiding
inconsistent or incompatible occupations. The
following year Elijah W. Sells made the following
comment regarding independence:
The position of the public accountant
in respect to corporations and their
management is always an independent
Continued on Page 22
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one. Unlike the attorney, he is not
expected to make out a case. The
character of the service he renders is
impersonal.2
During the first quarter of the twentieth century
the most debated ethical issue was whether or not
accountants should advertise. Subsequently, the
main issue has been auditor independence.
However, an incident in 1915 is noteworthy since
it anticipated the intense debates to occur years
later on the subject of independence. A question
arose regarding the propriety of a public
accounting firm auditing statements in which a
member of the firm was also the internal auditor.
The early "state of mind" concept of auditor
independence meant that client-accountant
relations should be such that the auditor's findings
would be influenced only by the facts. Later, the
concept was to evolve into an "appearance to
others" concept which places less emphasis on
actions and more on relationships.
Development of The Concept: 1926-1939
In 1926, the report of the American Institute of
Accountants' Committee on Professional Ethics
posed the question of whether or not it is ethical for
a CPA who is a director of a company to also certify
the company's balance sheet. A 1928 editorial in
the Journal of Accountancy answered this question
as follows:
The accountant should be so utterly
divorced from financial or other
participation in the success or failure of
an undertaking under audit that no one
could even point an accusing finger,
however unjustly, and allege the
possibility of bias.3
Another editorial in the same issue addressed the
question of an auditor who was also a stockholder.4
Although there had been a growing number of
references to the independence of auditors in the
professional literature, the word "independence"
was still absent from the Rules of Professional
Conduct. Although several rules already adopted
were designed to implicitly strengthen
independence, there was an absence of explicit
discussions regarding relationships with clients that
might tend to impair independence or appear to do
so.
At the American Institute of Accounting's 1931
annual meeting, Frederick H. Hurdman,
immediate past president of the Institute,
introduced the following resolution:
22

Whereas the relations between a
client, in the form of a corporation, and
the auditor for the corporation should
be one of entire independence, and
Whereas, it does not appear to be
practicable for the auditor consistently
to hold a dual relationship, as an
auditor and executive of the
corporation, and
Whereas, the public interest and
confidence will best be preserved by a
complete separation of these two
functions, therefore be it
Resolved, that the maintenance of a
dual relationship as director or officer of
a corporation, while acting as auditor of
that corporation, is against the best
interests of the public and the
profession and tends to destroy that
independence of action considered
essential in the relationship between
client and auditor.5
After a lengthy discussion, the resolution was
referred to the Committee on Professional Ethics.
However, the resolution was not acted upon by the
Institute in 1931 or 1932.
The Securities Act of 1933 required a public
accountant or certified public accountant to express
an opinion regarding the financial statements that
accompany a registration statement. Additionally,
there was concern for the independence of the
auditors. A rule was adopted on July 6, 1933 which
said that any CPA or public accountant will not be
recognized as independent if such an accountant is
not in fact independent.
Unless the Commission otherwise
directs, such accountant will not be
considered independent with respect to
any person in whom he has any interest,
directly or indirectly, or with whom he is
connected as an officer,
agent,
employee, promoter, underwriter,
trustee, partner, director, or person
performing similar function.6
Consequently, the concept of auditing
independence was evolving from one of integrity
and honesty with respect to fraud detection to one
of fraud detection plus the objective application of
accounting principles to describe the true economic
and financial position and results of a firm. The
emerging objectivity concept of independence can
be found in the following paragraph from an
editorial in a 1933 issue of the Journal of
Accountancy.
Continued
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The public accountant has his
impartial status in this great and
thrilling game of business. He knows
the rules. He knows the players. All the
spectators up in the grandstand on the
bleachers will rely on him, if he be a
true umpire at heart, to see that the
game is conducted fairly and that every
one who paid the price of admission
shall have a fair deal. The fact of an
umpire does not indicate any moral
obliquity in any player. An umpire is
needed because he can see both sides
when often the players, because of their
position in the game, can see only their
own.7
While the SEC rule prohibited any financial
interest, the AIA passed a resolution in 1934
prohibiting a "substantial financial interest."
Finally, in 1936 the SEC rule was amended to agree
with the AIA position. Thereafter, disputes
developed over the meaning of "substantial.'' This
eventually led the SEC to delete the word in 1950.
A 1935 article by A. C. Littleton asked for more
"independence in fact" from auditors.8 Littleton
called for amendment of the federal securities act
and the securities exchange act to give a larger
degree of real independence to public accountants.
Real independence is necessary to fulfill the
auditor's function as an unofficial representative
of the investing public. He stated that it was the
public accountant's already well-developed sense of
professional independence that qualifies him for
greater real independence as a "quasi-public"
representative of the interests of scattered and
inarticulate investors. However, more public
support is needed to accomplish this task.
Evidently, it was the SEC that exerted leadership
during the 1930s concerning the determination of
what constituted independence. This was
evidenced by its issuance of Accounting Series
Release No. 2 in 1937. This was the first release to
describe specific cases in which individual
accountants had been found to be not,
independent. The first release referred to a case in
which an accountant was not independent because
he owned stock in a client corporation, the value of
which accounted for more than one percent of his
personal fortunes.9

Amplification and Growth of the Concept: 19401959
It was not until 1940 that the AIA adopted a rule
of professional conduct regarding financial
independence to replace its 1934 resolution. The
rule read as follows:
A member or an associate shall not
express his opinion on financial
statements of any enterprise financed in
whole or in pan by public distribution
of securities, if he is himself the actual
or beneficial owner of a substantial
financial interest in the enterprise or if
he is committed to acquire such an
interest; nor shall a member or an
associate express his opinion on
financial statements which are used as a
basis for credit, if he is himself the
actual or beneficial owner of a
substantial financial interest in the
enterprise or if he is committed to
acquire such interest, unless he discloses
his financial interest in his report.10
In 1942, modifications of the above rule on
financial independence were made. Independence
was now seen to be impaired if the auditor owned
or was committed to buy a financial interest in the
enterprise which was substantial in relation to its
capital or to his own personal fortune. In addition,
the rule was expanded to incorporate financial
interests of his immediate family. These changes
were in accord with various earlier SEC decisions.11
At about this same time, the SEC was issuing
Accounting Series Releases regarding auditing
independence. In 1942, Accounting Series Release
No. 22 quoted an opinion of its Chief Accountant,
William W. Werntz as follows:
When an accountant and his client,
directly or through an affiliate, have
entered into an agreement of indemnity
which seeks to assure to the accountant
immunity from liability for his own
negligent acts, whether of omission or
commission, it is my opinion that one of
the major stimuli to objective and
unbiased consideration of the problems
encountered in a particular engagement
is removed or greatly weakened. Such
condition must frequently include a
departure from the standards of
objectivity and impartiality which the
concept of independence implies.12
Continued
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This same release also contains an excellent
summary of the SEC's attitude toward the general
question of independence. It states that the main
objective of total independence is to assure the
impartiality and objectivity needed for fair
consideration of problems arising in an audit. Any
circumstances that might be likely to bias the mind
of the auditor may be considered evidence of the
lack of independence. 13
Then, in 1944, Accounting Series Release No. 47
listed and summarized twenty rulings on auditors'
independence in specific cases. These ranged from
fairly clear-cut situations to other situations where
it was not very clear that the relationships were
likely to impair independence. Several situations in
which independence was found to be impaired are
summarized below:
1.

2.
3.

4.

5.

Both an accountant and a business associate
loaned money to the registrant. In addition,
the accountant's son was an officer of the
registrant.
The accountant made an advance to . the
registrant to finance a new department.
The registrant could not pay the
accountant's fee and instead pledged shares
of its stock to assure that the fee would be
paid. Furthermore, the accountant was
given an option to buy the pledged stock at
market price at the option date.
The accountant was a shareholder and the
treasurer of a company that sold a portion of
the registrant's products.
The partner's son was the chief accountant
and assistant treasurer of the registrant. In
addition, the son lived with the father.14

It was not until 1947 that a specific definition of
independence was formulated by the AIA. The
AIA defined independence as a state of mind. It is
an impartial attitude regarding the auditor's
findings. The auditor should be able to render
judgment unaffected by any self-interest which
could influence his opinion. Key characteristics of
the independence concept thus include honest
disinterest, unbiased judgment,
objective
consideration of facts, and judicial impartiality.
Independence "in fact" is emphasized in this
document.
The AIA also noted that rules of conduct only
dealt with objective standards and accordingly
could not assure independence.
Since
independence is a state of mind, its existence is at a
much deeper level than the visible display of
standards.15

A rather philosophical description of the
independence concept was offered in 1950 by
Edward B. Wilcox, a past president of the AIA. As
seen in the following quotation, Wilcox implied
that there are segments of public accounting that
do not require independence on the part of the
CPA:
That part of public accounting which
does clearly require independence
relates to the expression of an expert
opinion on representations in financial
statements. The purpose of the expert
opinion is to add to the credibility of the
statements. Those who rely on this
credibility are apt to be creditors or
investors, or sometimes employees,
customers or governmental agencies. As
in other areas of public accounting, the
expert incurs professional obligations of
an ethical nature to do a sound,
competent job. But he also incurs more
than that. He incurs an obligation to his
unknown audience for integrity. He
must protect them even though he does
not know who they are, and he must do
so even when it means opposing and
denying the wishes of those who have
employed him, and who he knows may
cease to do so. This is independence. l6
As noted earlier, in 1950 the SEC amended its
rule on independence by omitting the word
"substantial" from the phrase "any substantial
interest." This change was prompted because the
SEC was tired of debates regarding the essence of a
"substantial" financial interest. Interestingly, it
was not until 1962 that the AICPA moved to
disallow the direct financial interest or material
indirect financial interest in a firm being audited
by a member. Thus, during a twelve year period, a
double standard existed. No direct financial
interest was allowed for SEC engagements and no
substantial direct financial interest was permitted
for non-SEC engagements.
Shortly after the SEC introduced its restriction,
efforts were made by some members of the Illinois
Society of CPAs to broaden the scope of their rules
of ethics. In 1954 a new rule was adopted in that
state to prohibit a member, or a firm of which a
member was a partner, from expressing an opinion
on the financial statements of any organization if
the member, his partners, or their immediate
families living in the same household, had a direct
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or indirect financial interest in the organization in
question. It was the most rigorous rule on financial
interests, to that date, to have been adopted by any
professional society of accountants. The purpose of
the Illinois Society was clearly to raise standards of
professional conduct.17 The adoption of the rule
was apparently in recognition of the need to
preserve the "appearance of independence" as
well as independence in fact.
Refinement and Maturation of the Concept: 1960Present
A 1960 article by Sharaf and Mautz suggested
that independence is a three-dimensional concept
with each dimension being affected by the complex
of a social, economic, and personal relationship
encountered by the auditor in his professional
work. An auditor must be free from restriction or
bias in all three dimensions concurrently if he is to
be totally independent. These three dimensions of
independence are:
1.
Programming independence: This is
freedom from undue influence in the choice
of audit procedures and techniques and in
the extent to which they are applied. The
auditor must have freedom to develop his
own program with respect to the steps
included and the amount of work to be
undertaken.
2.
Investigative independence: This is freedom
from influence in the choice of activities,
areas, managerial policies, etc. to be
examined. No legitimate information
source should be unavailable to the auditor.
3.
Reporting independence: This is freedom
from undue influence in the statement of
facts revealed during the examination of, in
the
expression
of opinions,
or
recommendations resulting from the
examination.
Sharaf and Mautz go on to note that influence
and control can exist even without apparent outside
pressure. An accountant's prejudice or personal
bias, his desire for social or economic success, etc.,
may in effect impair his independence. Thus, the
detection of impaired independence is difficult in
many cases. It is therefore important to have guides
that can help the accountant evaluate his own
situation.18
Also, in 1960, the American Institute's
committee on professional ethics proposed an
amendment of the rules of conduct to prohibit any
member from serving as an employee or director of
a firm for which he was the auditor or from having
any financial interest in such a firm. After a long
The Accounting Historians Notebook, Spring, 1983
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and vigorous debate, the proposal was voted on
and passed at the Institute's 1961 annual meeting.
In effect, the rule moved the AICPA closer to the
SEC position.19
In 1961, Mautz and Sharaf published a
monograph called The Philosophy of Auditing
which included a critical examination of the
concept of independence. One important aspect of
independence addressed was whether the rendering
of management services to a client: is likely to
impair a CPA's independence in expressing an
opinion on the financial statements.
Management services tended to cloud the CPA's
appearance of independence in his capacity as
auditor. They recommended that the audit
function by strongly separated from the other
services offered by an accounting firm.20
Practitioners were disturbed to learn that the
propriety of offering management services was
being challenged. The Institute's committee on
professional ethics believed that an authoritative
opinion on this question was needed to guide the
membership. Therefore, in 1963 the committee
issued its Opinion No. 12 on independence. The
opinion stated that there was no likelihood of a
conflict of interest arising from the offering of
management advisory services and tax services. It
was, therefore, ethical to offer such services.21
This statement did not satisfy the academic
accountants. One, Arthur A. Schulte, Jr., was
concerned that the opinion offered no empirical
evidence to support its contentions. Schulte thus
conducted a survey and reported his results in the
July, 1963 issue of The Accounting Review, He
mailed questionnaires to four selected groups: (1)
research and financial analysts of brokerage firms;
(2) commercial loan and trust officers of banks; (3)
investment officers of insurance companies; and (4)
investment officers of domestic mutual funds.
Schulte found that ninety-seven percent of the
responding third parties attached a special
importance to the CPA's audit independence. In
addition, forty-five
percent believed that
management consulting did tend to impair audit
independence and fifty-five percent believed that it
did not. 22
These findings were sharply criticized by Carey
and Doherty. They state that:
Nowhere in the questionnaire or the
article interpreting it is there a
definition of the term 'management
consulting.' This term may well evoke a
reaction different from that evoked by
'management services,' which is
commonly used by the profession itself.
Continued
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In any event, it cannot be assumed that
all the respondents to the questionnaire
were familiar with the specific services
offered by CPA firms as aids to
management. The respondents may
have read into the question types of
'consulting' which in fact are not
commonly engaged in by CPAs.
It is difficult to believe that
reasonable observers—stockholders,
creditors or other users of financial
statements, or the business public
generally—would see any conflict of
interest in the fact that the auditor, in
addition to giving an opinion on the
financial statements, also applied his
technical knowledge and skill to the
improvement
of
management's
planning, control and decision-making
processes.23
On the other hand, it is sometimes suggested
that in providing management services the CPA
effectively becomes an employee of the client and
loses hs independence as an auditor. One response
to this charge runs as follows. The essence of an
employee is his dependence on management. If
fired, he has no job. However, neither the
consultant, nor the auditor is out of a job if he loses
a client. Both the auditor and the consultant have
economic independence with respect to their
client.24
In 1966, Abraham J. Briloff conducted a survey
which supported the results of the Schulte study
previously mentioned. Briloff's questionnaire was
sent to financial personnel, practicing accountants,
and academic accountants. Fifty-three percent of
the responding financial personnel believed that
the provision of management services by CPAs
detracted from the significance of their audit
opinions.25
In response to such confusion, the Institute
appointed a special ad hoc committee to study the
problem. The committee was chaired by Malcolm
M. Devore. The committee stated that it had found
no substantive evidence to indicate that the
provision of management services has, in fact,
impaired independence. However, it also found no
empirical evidence to dispute Schulte's findings
linking management services with an "apparent"
lack of independence. The committee made several
noteworthy recommendations. One involved the
issuance of two statements or position papers
regarding (1) the nature of management services
offered by a CPA and (2) the role of CPAs in
rendering those services. A second noteworthy
26

suggestion was the use of audit committees,
consisting of outside directors, to choose the
company's auditors and to determine questions
relating to the appearance of independence. In
addition, the CPAs should report periodically to
the audit committee regarding all services
rendered. This reporting would be done prior to
the committee's selection of the firm's auditors. 26
A 1968 article by Walter Kell classified
management services into "accounting" and
"administrative" services. According to Kell,
accounting-based services, such as budgeting and
inventory control, evolve naturally from the audit
engagement and the CPA's familiarity with the
client's information system. Kell believed that the
public accepts these services as legitimate concerns
of the independent auditor. Administrative-based
services such as market surveys and plant layout are
outside the scope of the audit and extend far
beyond the client's information system. Kell
contends that there is no conflict between the
performance of accounting services and audit
independence but that the rendering of
administrative services could possibly affect such
independence. He suggests the establishment of an
echics rule identifying the provision of
administrative services to an audit client as
incompatible with independence. 27
Accounting Series Release No. 126 was issued in
1972. This release covered several areas including:
1.
The provision of guidelines; for determining
the existence of independence;
2.
A listing of example situations in which
independence could be challenged;
3.
A statement that the basic consideration in
management service activities was whether
the client appears to be completely
dependent upon the CPA's judgment and
skill or is reliant only to the extent that is
customary with respect to consultation
advice;
4.
A statement that systems design is a proper
function of a public accountant and that
computer programming is an aspect of
systems design and does not constitute a
bookkeeping service;
5.
A statement that when unpaid fees to the
accountant become material relative to the
current audit fee, a question may arise
regarding the accountant's independence;
and
6.
A statement that joint business ventures
with clients, limited
partnership
agreements, investments in supplies or
Continued
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customer companies, and rental of blocks of
computer time to a client would adversely
affect independence.28
In 1973, the AICPA adopted new rules of
conduct (Rule 101). This was modified slightly in
1978 and has remained unchanged since.
Conclusion
Independence is the sine qua non of professional
auditors. It has been a major concern of auditors and
users of audit reports since the early days of the
profession. The SEC has had an important
influence on the accounting professions' emerging
standards of independence. Specifically, the
responsibility of the SEC was to determine
independence in specific cases. It therefore
gravitated toward a practical definition of the
concept which stressed the importance of observed
behavior and relationships.
For the most part, the accounting profession has
relied upon a theoretical definition of
independence and has used phrasers such as "a state
of mind," an "attitude of impartiality," etc. The
profession in the United States is now dealing in a
more realistic manner with the practical aspects of
the concept. As shown in this article, independence
has been and still is the historical and philosophical
foundation of the accounting profession.
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